

Message Text

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TO TEXTS PARA THREE)

EEO 11652: NA

TAGS: PINT, XC

SUBJECT: CASE FOR CONTINUING AID TO NON-COMMUNIST INDOCHINA

FOR EA/TB DEXTER

1. I HAVE RECEIVED A LETTER FROM LAWRENCE E. GRINTNER OF THE FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE ASKING FOR MY COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS ON AN ENCLOSED LIST OF ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF CONTINUING US AID TO NON-COMMUNIST INDOCHINA. GRINTNER WILL APPEAR AS A WITNESS FOR WILLIAM RUSHER WHEN HE MEETS AL LOWENSTEIN ON "THE ADVOCATES" TELEVISION PROGRAM MARCH 20. GRINTNER'S SUGGESTED LIST OF ARGUMENTS IS AS FOLLOWS.

(A) AS LONG AS MOSCOW AND PEKING EQUIP HANOI WITH WEAPONS TO BE USED AGAINST CAMBODIA, LAOS AND SOUTH VIET-O LBWP, THE U

.S. HAS THE RIGHT AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO HELP THE VICTIMS OF THE COMMUNIST ATTACKS DEFEND THEMSELVES. THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT ABANDON THOSE COUNTRIES WITH WHOM IT HAS FOUGHT SIDE BY SIDE ONCE THE MAIN FIGHTING STOPS. WE HAVE NOT ABANDONED SOUTH KOREA. WE SHOULD NOT ABANDON SOUTH VIETNAM, CAMBODIA OR LAOS.

(B) WHILE INDOCHINA MAY NOT BE ABSOLUTELY VITAL TO U.S. INTERESTS, IT IS IN THE AMERICAN INTEREST TO SEE THAT

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AREA OF THW WORLD REMAIN INDEPENDENT, STABLE, AND UN-

SUBVERTED.

(C) THE JNAUARY 1973 VIETNAM ACCORDS GREATLY DIS-CRIMINATE AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAM AND, BY EXTENSION, CAM-BODIA AND LAOS. THERE ARE NOT NOW NOR HAVE THERE EVER BEEN ANY SOUTH VIETNAMESE, LAOTIAN OR CAMBODIAN TROOPS BATTERING OR OCCUPYING NORRTH VIETNAM. MOREOVER, UNLIKE SOVIET MILITARY AID TO NORTH VIETNAM, AMERICAN AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM HAS BEEN LARGELY OF A DEFENSIVE NATURE. FURTHERMORE THE ACCORDS NOT ONLY CODIFY THE FICTION THAT THE VIET CONG ARE SOMEHOW INDEPENDENT OF HANOI, THEY MAKE NO MENTION WHATSOEVER OF NORTH VIETNAM'S EXPEDITIONARY FORCES OPERATING THROUGHOUT INDOCHINA. IN SHORT, THEY LEGALLY PERMIT HANOI'S FORCES TO OCCUPY, INFILTRATE, EXFILTRATE AND ATTACK ANY OF THESE COUNTRIES AT WILL BE TREATING THE NVA AS A GHOST ARMY.

(D) THE ASTOUNDING SILENCE OF THOSE PAST CRITICS OF AMERICAN AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE OPERATIONS IN INDOCHINA NOW THAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE INDISCRIMINATELY SHELLING THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF PHNOM PENH (AS THEY HAVE DONE AGAINST SAIGON WITH SOVIET 122MM ROCKETS) IS APPALLING.

(E) THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT--WHICH AT MODERATE LEVELS OF HOSTILITY SERVES THE AMERICAN INTEREST IN ASIA BECAUSE IT TIES THE TWO COMMUNIST GIANTS DOWN TO WASTEFUL DEFENSE EXPENDITURES--IS KEPT GOING IN PART BECAUSE OF MOSCOW'S AND PEKING'S CONTINUING COMPETITION TO CURRY FAVOR WITH HANOI. WERE HANOI TO GET CONTROL FOALL OF INDOCHINA, IT WOULD BE A DESTABILIZING INFLUENCE NOT ONLY IN INDOCHINA BUT ALSO IN OTHER AREAS OF ASIA AS WELL. THEREFORE IT IS IN THE AMERICAN INTEREST TO SEE THAT HANOI, MOSCOW AND PEKING CHECK AND BALANCE EACH OTHER'S INFLUENCE IN INDOCHINA BY PREVENTING ANY COMBINATION OF THESE THREE COUNTRIES FROM DOMINATING THE AREA.

2. I SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONS AND ELABORATIONS.

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(A) THE FIRST ARGUMENT SHOULD POINT OUT THAT WE HAVE NOT ABANDONED WESTERN EUROPE (IN ADDITION TO SOUTH KOREA). IT SHOULD INCLUDE DISCUSSION OF THE NEED TO HELP THE INDOCHINESE COUNTRIES REBUILD ECONOMICALLY AND IT SHOULD POINT OUT THAT THIS ASSISTANCE IS MORR EXPENSIVE AND DIFFICULT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES OF CONTINUED NORTH VIETNAMESE SUPPORT FOR AND PARTICIPATION IN A STATE OF WAR, PARTICULARLY IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND

CAMBODIA. HAVING EXPENDED SO MUCH BLOOD AND TREASURE ALREADY, WE SHOULD NOT MAKE A MOCKERY OF OUR HUMAN AND MATERIAL SACRIFICES BY SCRIMPING ON THE RELATIVELY MINOR COSTS FOR INSURING SOUTH VIETNAMESE SURVIVAL IN IDEPENDENCE.

(B) WE SHOULD ADD TO THE SECOND ARGUEMENT THAT WE FAVOR ULTIMATE NEUTRALIZATION WHEN THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA ARE STRONG ENOUGH ETHEMSELVES TO FORM A COLLECTIVEITY OF STABLE SOVEREIGN STATES. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THIS GOAL WILL BE POSSIBLE IF NORTH VIETNAM FILLS ITS AMBITION TO CONTROL ALL OF INDOCHINA, PARTICULARLY BY MILITARY MEANS.

(C) I WOULD MODIFY THE TONE OF THE THIRD ARGUMENT BY SUGGESTING THAT WHILE THE DESCRIPTION OF HOW THE ACCORDS ARE WORKING IN PRACTICE IS ACCURATE, THEE RISKS WERE TAKEN AS AN ACT OF GOOD FAITH ON OUR PART IN THE HOPE THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WOUULD NOT VIOLATE THEM AS THEY HAVE. WE RECOGNIZED, HOWEVER, THAT THEY MIGHT NOT FULLY ABIDE BY ANY AGREEMENT, HOWEVER, AND THIS IS PRECISELY WHY WE INCLUDED PROVISIONS FOR CONTINUED ASSISTANCE TO THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE.

(D) THE FOURTH ARGUEMTN IS EXCELLENT. YOU COULD ALSO TOSS IN THE MARCH 9 SHELLING OF THE CALLAY ELEMENTARY SCHOOL THAT HAS SO FAR TAKEN THE LIVES OF 26 CHILDREN.

(E) MY SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING THE THIRD ARGUMENT ARE APPLICABLE FOR THE FINAL ARGUMENT AS WELL. WE MAY NOT LIKE IT, BUT POLITICAL POWER BALANCES REMAIN A CRITICAL ELEMENT IN INTERNATINAL RELATIONS. WE IGNORE THEM LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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AND THE NEED FOR THEIR CONTINUED READJUSTMENT AT OUR PERIL.

3. I WOULD SUGGEST THAT GRINTNER GET A COPY OF WILLIAM BUCKLEY'S COLUMN, "WHAT IS MORALITY?", AS IT APPEARED IN THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE OF 15 JANUARY 1972. THE ANALOGY PRESENTED THERIN OF AN EAST GERMAN INVASION OF WEST GERMANY DESERVES REPEATING. IT USUALLY DISCOMFITS CRITICS OF OUR ROLE IN VIETNAM WHEN THEY ARE FORCED TO THINK ABOUT PARALLEL SITUATIONS IN EUROPE OR THE MIDDLE EAST WHERE THEY ARE APT TO INSTINCTIVELY TAKE A DIFFERENT TACK.

4. SAIGON FOR AMBASSADOR MARTIN: I WOULD APPRECIATE ANY FURTHER ARGUEMTNS OR COMMENDS YOU WOULD CARE TO MAKE.

5. FOR EA BUREAU: I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS AND
ADDITIONS AS WELL. PLEASE PASS THEM ALONG WITH MINE
DIRECTLY TO MR. GRITNTNER WELL BEFORE MARCH 20.
KINTNER

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